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NOTES

Contract Law in the People's Republic
of China-Rule or Tool: Can the
PRC's Foreign Economic Contract Law
be Administered According to the
Rule of Law?
ABSTRACT

The emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
as a market power and the reversion of Hong Kong to PRC
sovereignty in 1997 have focused the attention of the
internationalbusiness community on the PRC's willingness to
enforce contractual obligations according to the rule of law.
Some scholars have questioned whether the rule of law can

ever be realized in China without a change in the basic
system of governance. This Note attempts to answer that
question, at least in the context of the Foreign Economic
Contract Law (FECL), the law governing contractual disputes
between Sino andforeign enterprisesin the PRC.
This Notefirst discusses the importance of the rule of law
in autonomous business transactions and differentiates the
rule of law from an instrumentalistperspective of the role of
law. The Note then addresses contract law in the PRC,
including the traditional reliance on the rule by law, the
government's attempt to move towards the rule of law, and
the current status of the law governing contracts between
Sino and foreign enterprises. The Note describes the
characteristicsof a society governed by the rule of law. Using
these characteristicsas a baseline, it assesses the possibility
that Sino-foreign contractual disputes in the PRC may be
adjudicated according to the rule of law. It includes a
description of the obstaclesfacing the implementation of the
rule of law, suggestions for overcoming them, and an
495
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assertionthat it may be easier to overcome these obstacles in
the limited context of the contract law governing foreign and
domestic enterprises. The Note concludes that although the
PRC could institute structuralchanges that would further the
goal of achieving the rule of law without altering the current
system of government, ultimately the true implementation of
the rule of law in the context of the FECL will either be the
result of politicalchange or the cause of it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I
"Arbitrary Justice: Breach of contract in China becomes test case;"
"S&P Warns China That Confidence May Be Hurt by Contract
2
Disputes."
Despite the size and growth potential of the People's Republic of
China (PRC), some international investors are 3questioning the
wisdom of doing business with Chinese companies.

Highly publicized contractual disputes between Chinese and
foreign enterprises have focused attention on the PRC's perceived
failure to consistently enforce contractual obligations according to
the rule of law.4

China has drawn the attention of the

international community for two reasons. First, despite perceived
problems with contractual enforcement, the PRC represents a
large and attractive market for foreign enterprises. China's
economy is the most dynamic of any size in the world.5 With a

1.
Nigel Holloway. Arbitrary Justice: Breach of Contract in China Becomes
Test Case, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 20, 1995, at 78. available in 1995 WL-FEER
9081137.

2.

Erik Guyot, S&P Warns China That Confidence May Be Hurt by Contract

Disputes. WALL

ST.

J. EUR.. Dec. 15. 1994. at 13, available in 1994 WL-WSJE

3171393.

3.
"After rushing to grab a piece of China's vaunted growth potential,
companies are emerging with cautionary tales about how not to do business in a
place where central government control is unraveling, business law is in its
infancy and what Westerners would call corruption is ingrained in the way of life."
Gord McLaughlin, Chinese Proverb: Woe to He Who Tries to Court the Dragon in Its
Own Lair. FIN. POST. Feb. 4. 1995. at 16. availablein 1995 WL 4330108.
4.
For example, in late 1994, the PRC's government ordered the
McDonald's corporation to relocate one of its largest and most profitable
restaurants, despite the existence of a long-term lease. Stephen Hutcheon, China:
McDonald's Loses Prime Site In Beling Plaza, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 14,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. In 1995, Lehman Brothers
sued tvo state-owned Chinese conglomerates in a U.S. federal court alleging that
the conglomerates had failed to cover trading losses. Lehman Bros. Commercial
Corp. v. Minmetals, Int'l, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,841,
1995 WL 380119 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995); Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v.
China Int'l United Petroleum & Chem. Co., No. 94 Civ. 8304 (JFK), 1995 WL
380106 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995).
5.
Doak Barnett, PoliticalOverview, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT INDENG'S
CHINA 1, 5 (Shao-Chuan Leng ed., 1994).
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population of 1.1 billion, 6 an average annual gross domestic
product growth rate of seven percent over the last fourteen
years, 7 an abundance of low-cost labor, natural resources and

space, and its proximity to other booming markets in East and

Southeast Asia, 8 the PRC is an attractive target for firms seeking
to open new markets. For example, from 1979 to 1982, the
amount of money committed for investment in China by U.S.
companies totaled $2.81 million.9 By 1995, U.S. investment In
China had increased to $7.471 billion. 10
Second, Hong Kong, a hub for foreign ventures in the Pacific
Rim,II is scheduled to revert to PRCsovereignty in 1997.12 Hong
Kong is one of the most prosperous economies in the world In
part because of its commitment to a free market economy and to
the application of the rule of law in business practice. 13 The
concern is that when the PRC takes over Hong Kong, Hong Kong's
relatively effective legal system will be replaced by one resembling
the PRC's. 14 The comments of a U.S. judge in a recent wrongful
death case exemplified these fears.' 5 Holding that the case could
be tried in the United States, the judge noted that "the uncertain
future of the Hong Kong legal system, given the island's reversion
to Chinese sovereignty in less than two years, counsels heavily in
favor of jurisdiction to ensure that the [plaintiffs] have an

6.
Gary J. Dernelle, Direct ForeignInvestment and ContractualRelations In
the People'sRepublic of China, 6 DEPAULBUS. L.J. 331,332 (1994).
7.
Richard Lesher, Taiwan: Should Congress Grant Permanent 'Most
Favored Nration' Statu to China? Yes: Trade Empowers Chinese Citizens of Every
Rank and Quickens the MarchToward Democracy. TOPICS - AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN
TAIPEI, Feb. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9277740.
8.
Joseph Battat, Foreign Investment in China in the 90s: Developing
Trends, E. AsIAN ExEc. REP., Aug. 15, 1991 at 11, 14.
9.
Business as Usual, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (DENVER). May 11. 1996, at
4B, available in 1996 WL 7568241.
10.
Id.
11.
For example, over 900 U.S. firms currently do business in Hong Kong.
Martin C.M. Lee, Rule of Law: Why China Needs Hong Kong's Legal System WALL
ST. J., Dec. 28, 1994, at A13, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 2058178. "Hong Kong is
[also] China's second-largest trading partner and accounts for about 60 per cent
of China's stock of foreign investment." HK Business "Role Model for China," H.K.
STANDARD, Dec. 20. 1996. availablein 1996 WL 13887312.
12.
Lee, supra note 11.
13.
"[Hong Kong] is an important international financial center, second
only to Tokyo in the Pacific region." Anthony Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View
of a Hong Kong Lawyer, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 309. 310 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
It has 76 of the top 100 banks in the world and is among the top 12 traders in the
world. Id. "[Hong Kong] achieved this prosperity in a milieu of capitalism amidst
minimum government Intervention and the Rule of Law." Id.
14.
Senior Chinese officials have frequently threatened to abolish Hong
Kong's bill of rights and its common law legal system. Id.
15.
Nowak v. Tak How Investment Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 25, 34 (D. Mass.
1995), affd, 94 F.3d 718 (1st. Cir. 1996).
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opportunity to obtain redress, if any be appropriate, for the
16
grievous loss they have suffered."
The judge's comments reflect the belief of many experts in
the United States and Hong Kong that the rule of law will be
eroded in Hong Kong after the island reverts to Chinese
sovereignty in 1997.17 Erosion of the rule of law would expose
companies in Hong Kong and those that deal with them to the
same risk of contractual non-enforcement as that faced by
companies currently doing business with or in the PRC.18
Further, Hong Kong is a major source of free and unrestricted
economic information concerning the PRC. 19 Some speculate
that this source of infonnation will dry up after reversion, thus
20
increasing the risk of investing in mainland China.
The adjudication of contractual disputes according to the
rule of law is extremely important to the international business
community because the PRC is an attractive market and
adjudication according to the rule of law significantly increases
the predictability of contractual enforcement. 2 1
However,
because the law traditionally has been viewed from an
instrumentalist perspective in the PRC, 22 the question has been
raised of whether, given the PRC's current system of government,
the law can ever be the kind of overlying, guiding principle that
makes contractual enforcement predictable. The goal of this Note
is to answer this question, at least with respect to the PRC's
Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL), which governs disputes
23
between enterprises of the PRC and foreign businesses.

If. THE RULE OF LAW, RULE BY LAW AND CONTRACTS
In the West, a key characteristic

of a "civil society" is

"autonomous economic organization and transactions."24

The

belief that giving individuals the freedom to maximize their own

16.

Id.

17.
Though tort and contract law are not expected to change as quickly as
criminal law and police enforcement, change is expected. Henry J. Reske, Experts
FearHong Kong Legal System in Peril,A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 33.
18.
Lee, supra note 11.
19.
"Beijing releases the 'good news.' but the most important economic
information-the 'bad news'--comes only from Hong Kong." Martin Lee, A
Message From Hong Kong to Davos, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at 8, available
in 1997 WL-WSJA 3796558.
20.
Id.
21.
See infra Part 11.
22.
See infra Part III.A 1.
23.
See infra notes 83 and 85.
24.

RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 121 (1994).
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wealth results in the maximization of society's wealth Is a

comerstone of capitalist philosophy. 25 As the noted economist
John Maynard Keynes stated in his defense of capitalism during
the depression of the 1930s, the allocative efficiencies and
experimental creativity achieved through autonomous economic
organization and transactions are "powerful instrument[s] to
26
better the future."
The rule of law is a predicate for achieving autonomous
economic organization and transactions. 2 7 The rule of law has
two basic principles: (1) people should be ruled by the law and
obey it, and (2) the law should be such that people will be able to
be guided by it. 2 8 Hence, the rule of law assures that individuals
know what the law is so they can maximize their own welfare
within its confines. It also assures that individuals can pursue
this wealth-maximizing autonomy without interference from
either other individuals or the state. 2 9 By assuring that the law
is applied equally to all, is binding on the state, and prevents
arbitrary actions by the state, the rule of law provides the
freedom for the members of a "civil society" to order their own
30
economic affairs.
Unlike the West, where the law embodies universally held
ethical norms and is traditionally regarded as absolute, 3 1 China
has taken an instrumentalist view of the role of law.3 2 Under the
instrumentalist view, law exists not as an embodiment of
commonly held ethical norms, but as a tool for advancing the

25.
An individual does not "intend[] to promote the public interest... he
Intends only his own gain, and he is in this. as In many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his Intention." 1 ADAM
SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H.
Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776). It Is not surprising that
both The Wealth of Nations and the Declarationof Independence appeared in the
same year. "Political freedom from the tyranny of monarchy was closely related to
emancipation of free-market pricing from the Interfering hand of state regulation."
PAULA. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 2 (11th ed. 1980).
26.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES. THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT. INTEREST
AND MONEY 380 (Harcourt, Brace 1936).
27.
Richard Thornburgh. The Soviet Union and the Rule of Law. 69 FOREIGN
AFF. 13, 14 (1995).

28.
Eric J. Segall, JusticeScalia, CriticalLegal Studies, and the Rule of Law,
62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 991, 995 (1994).
29.
Id.
30.
Franz Michael, Law: A Tool of Power, in HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 33, 33 (WESIVEW PRESS 1988).
31.
This conception of the rule of law is well anchored in both Western and
non-Western societies, including the United States, the nation-states of Europe,
and Asian countries such as Japan and China prior to the overthrow of the
national government In 1949. Id.
32.
Id. at 35.
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goals of the state. 3 3 The state's policy is the "soul of the law."34

Individual rights are defined by the law, 3 5 as opposed to the law
being shaped by natural rights. 3 6 Under the rule of law, because
law embodies commonly held ethical norms, legal change occurs
only in response to changes in other spheres. 37 Under the

instrumentalist view, legal change does not occur in response to
changes in other spheres, but rather,
is frequently used as a
38
means of promoting change elsewhere.
There is a strong relationship between the rule of law and
Western contract law. In the West, it is believed that the
objective and predictable enforcement of contracts is desirable
because it maximizes the welfare of the parties involved, thus
promoting the welfare of society as a whole. 3 9 Individuals enter
into contracts because they believe that an exchange will make
them each better off.40

Where contracts are enforced in an

objective and predictable manner, individuals are better able to
determine which transactions will be wealth-maximizing and are
able to shift the risk of uncertain events in economically efficient
ways. 4 1 On the other hand, where contractual enforcement is
subject to changing state policy, wealth-maximizing transfers
may be voided by the state or never attempted due to the risk of

33.
Joseph Stalin called the law a "weapon." Id. According to Communist
doctrine, the law is a tool "used by the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . to
suppress opposing classes and to transform society into a predestined socialist
and communist order." Id.
34.
BILL BRUGGER & STEPHEN REGLAR. POLITIcs
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 180 (1994).
35.
1& at 181.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN

36.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
37.
Professor Feinerman has noted that:
The almost universal experience of Western market economies has
been that law evolves following, and in response to, changes in other
realms that create conditions for economic development. For instance,
economic conditions must be ripe for development to occur, the political
climate must be conducive to change, and there must be the requisite
cultural or societal belief that change is desirable and possible. For law to
be a part of this process, there must be a widespread belief that law
matters and that legal changes can and will be enforced at all levels of
society. Thus, law is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
meaningful economic change or development.
James V. Feinerman, Economic and Legal Reform in China, 1978-91, PROBLEMS OF
COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1991. at 62, 66.
38.
Id.
39.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 21 (2d ed. 1990).

40.
41.

SMITH, supra note 25, at 456.
Id.
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contractual non-enforcement. 4 2
Further, the resolution of
contractual disputes by a legal system that is an impartial
mediator of interests is beneficial for society because It
establishes rules to resolve future disputes and "encourage[s]
socially desirable behavior by future bargainers."4 3 Because of
the advantages inherent in a system that provides consistent
enforcement of contractual obligations according to the rule of
law-i.e., welfare maximization and a reduction of risk-the
international business community has become increasingly
concerned about the perceived risk of contractual nonenforcement in the PRC. 4 4 This concern has developed despite

economic and legal reforms in the PRC ostensibly designed to
make the law governing Sino-foreign contracts more like Western
common law.

III. THE CONTRACT LAW OF THE PRC
In the late 1970s, the PRC initiated its "Four Modernizations
program" program aimed at modernizing the PRC's agriculture,
industry, defense, science, and technology, thus transforming
China into a "powerful, modern, socialist country by the end of
this century."45 The primary focus of the economic reforms was
to change the economic system 4 6 from one that was centrally

42.

To be sure, there

is

some government

intrusion

in economic

transactions in the West. Regulated markets such as securities exchanges, and
the proliferation of consumer protection laws are examples of governmental
limitations on autonomy in economic transactions. Felnerman, supra note 37, at

66.

However, such use of law is entirely consistent with the experience that
law develops out of change in other spheres: these laws came about as a
governmental response to the rise in economic power of large corporations.

Legal change will always affect markets in some way, so there Is a
continuing synergy between law and economic development-the economy
causes the law to evolve, which in turn affects the market, and so on.
Id.
43.
ROBERT E. SCOTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 19
(2d ed. 1993).
44.
This concern was exemplified in comments made by James Penrose,
assistant general counsel for Standard & Poor's Ratings Group. Through Penrose,
Standard & Poor's warned China that its ability to raise foreign capital could be
put at risk by a "pattern of repeated behavior" in which state-owned, Chinese
businesses allegedly breached contracts with Western companies. Guyot, supra
note 2, at 13.
45.
COLIN MACKERRAS ETAL., CHINA SINCE 1978 63 (1994).
46.
Id. at 64.
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47
planned to one that was decentralized and market driven.
48
Towards this end, the PRC instituted a series of changes with a
common characteristic: "the responses in all cases emphasized
notions of contract, the legal responsibility of economic actors to
perform their agreements, and the value of individual autonomy
in
setting
the terms of economic
transactions
and
relationships."4 9
These reforms mandated that the PRC
transform its legal system from one based on an instrumentalist
perspective of the role of law into one more closely resembling a
legal system governed by the rule of law, at least in the context of
the contract law governing economic transactions between Sino
and foreign enterprises.

A. The Modem History of ContractLaw in the PRC
Until recently, contractual relations in the PRC were subject
to the government's instrumentalist view of the role of law. The
goal of Chinese contract law was to support the government's
economic plan rather than to promote the autonomous ordering
of economic transactions.
However, the PRC's efforts to
decentralize the economy and make it market driven would have
been undercut by a legal system in which the law had only an
instrumentalist role. Consequently, along with economic reforms,
the PRC instituted legal reforms which appeared to herald the
coming of the rule of law.
1. Pre-Reform Contract Law: The Instrumentalist Approach
Before the economic reforms of the 1970s, contract law was
no more necessary to settle disputes in the PRC's planned
economy than it would have been to settle disputes between the
divisions of a vertically integrated firm. Within China's planned
economy, every organization theoretically worked towards the
same goal-the achievement of the state's economic objectives.
Hence, the PRC functioned like one large, vertically-integrated
firm.5 0
Manufacturers and suppliers were part of the same

47.
Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and Its Discontents: Understanding
EconomicLaw in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 285-86 (1992).
48.
The functions of state government and enterprise management were
separated. Enterprise managers were encouraged to attempt to satisfy consumer
demand without subsidies for losses and administrative control over the economy
has been loosened. Feinerman, supra note 37, at 63.
49.
Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with A Chinese Face: Socially
Embedded Factorsin the Transformationfrom Hierarchyto Market, 1978-1989, 5 J.
CHINESE L. 143, 144 (1991).

50.

Professor Clarke notes that:
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organization. Under this system, administrative orders from the
centralized planning body, rather than contract law, governed
transactions between parties. 5 ' Where a centralized plan could
not cover all the details of production and allocation of resources,
contracts were used to fill in the gaps. However, because
contracts were merely a means for achieving the state's plan, the
government would not enforce contracts that did not support the
plan's goals. 5 2
Consequently. economic transactions were
subject to the instrumentalist view of the role of law. The goal of
Chinese contract law was not to foster mutually beneficial
exchanges through the protection of expectancy interests, as U.S.
law does, 53 but to promote state control and the state's economic
plan.
2. Economic Reform
The 1970s were a period of massive upheaval in the PRC.
Following the end of the "cultural revolution" and the death of
Mao Zedong 54 a power struggle ensued from which Deng
Xiaoping emerged as the PRC's preeminent leader. 5 5 Since early
in his political career, Deng had been a proponent of "market

Ministries [were] divisions within the firm and enterprises [were]
factories. Within such a system. prices [were] merely accounting
conventions and consequently "profit" (price received for output minus
price paid for inputs) [was] not a good index of efficiency or social utility.
Central planners decide[d] what enterprises should produce and then
attempt[edi to ensure, through commands, that the appropriate raw
materials, labor, and transportation facilities [were] available to realize the
targets.
Clarke, supranote 47, at 287.
51.
Dernelle, supra note 6, at 346.
The Provisional Methods on the
Signing of Contracts by (State) Organs, State-Run Enterprises, and Cooperatives,
China's 1950s counterpart to the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code, was not
designed to make it easier for enterprises to enter Into mutually beneficial
exchanges. but to bring economic activity under government control. Clarke,
supra note 47, at 308. "All transactions involving continuing obligations had to
involve a contract, and the parties then had to submit a copy to the local People's
Bank and to various other supervisory bodies. Furthermore, any payments under
the contract had to be made through the People's Bank." Id.
52.
Rather, if a contract did not support an existing plan's goal or if the
plan changed such that the contract was no longer consistent with It, the
government would Insist that the parties re-write the contract in accordance with
state policy. Clarke, supranote 47, at 309.
53.

See FARNSWORTH, supranote 39, at 9.

54.
Mao Zedong was the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from
1943 until his death in 1976, and was the President of the PRC from 1949 to
1959. MACKERRAS, supranote 45, at 5.
55.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49. at 171.
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socialism,"5 6 which combines a market driven economy with an
adherence to socialist principles. 57 After Deng's rise to power in
1978, the PRC launched a series of reforms consistent with
Deng's beliefs.5 8
The linchpin of the PRC's economic reforms was the
decentralization of decision-making authority. 5 9 The high-level
bureaucracy only maintained decision-making authority over key
sectors of the economy. 60 Decisions in other economic sectors
were guided by market forces and made by lower level
bureaucrats or enterprise management instead of the central
government. 61
Freeing enterprises and workers from the

56.
Deng held major party and government posts from 1949 until the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. MACKERRAS. supra note 45, at 5.
However, during the Cultural Revolution, the goal of which was to transform "the
superstructure of Chinese society into a proletarian culture." id. at 8, Deng was
branded as "the Number 2 person in authority taking the capitalist road," id. at 5.
57.
Though Deng was more interested in using communism as a tool for
achieving economic growth, he was still a devout Marxist-Leninist. Id. at 6. In a
major speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work entitled
"Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," Deng outlined the prerequisites for
achieving the four modernizations of economic reform:
1.
2.
3.
4.

We
We
We
We

must keep to the socialist road.
must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat.
must uphold the leadership of the communist party.
must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

DENG XIAOPING. THE SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 171-72 (1984).

58.
Barnett, supranote 5, at 1.
59.
Clarke, supra note 47, at 283-84. The Communique of the Third
Plenum of the Central Committee of the 11th Communist Party Congress made
the following links between economic reform and the shift of decision making
authority:
[Olne of the serious shortcomings in the structure of economic
management in our country Is the over-concentration of authority, and it
is necessary boldly to shift it under guidance from the leadership to lower
levels so that the local authorities and industrial and agricultural
enterprises will have greater power of decision in management under the
guidance of unified state planning; ... it is necessary to act firmly in line
with economic law, attach importance to the role of the law of value,
consciously combine ideological and political work with economic methods
and give full play to the enthusiasm of cadres and workers for production;
It is necessary, under the centralized leadership of the Party, to tackle
conscientiously the failure to make a distinction between the Party, the
government, and the enterprise, and to put a stop to the substitution of
Party for government and the substitution of government for enterprise
administration.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 194 (quoting Communique of the Third Plenary
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, BEIJING
REv., Dec. 29, 1978).
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
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"shackles of state control" was expected to enable them to

improve productivity and efficiency. 6 2 The PRC expected that a

system based on freedom of contract rather than on central
planning would increase production because it would provide
63
rewards for producers.
Along with the shift of decision-making authority to the
enterprise level, the PRC implemented a system of rewards for
profitable management. 6 4
As discussed above, individuals
allowed to autonomously enter into economic transactions are
able to maximize their own welfare and thus society's welfare. 65
Consequently, it was hoped that decentralizing decision-making
authority and introducing market rewards would improve
66
efficiency and increase production.
Another important goal of the economic reforms was to
attract foreign capital and technology.6 7 To achieve the "four
modernizations," the PRC commenced an "open door" policy in
1978.68 The "open door" policy was implemented in recognition
of the need to attract foreign capital, technology, and equipment
to modernize the PRC's infrastructure. 69 Facets of the open door
policy included promulgation of several laws concerning foreign
investment, 70 the delineation of special economic zones to provide
foreign investors with favorable operating conditions and
preferential treatment, 7 1 and the creation of securities and

62.
Clarke, supranote 47. at 284.
63.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49. at 181.
64.
For example, in the agricultural sector, a "contract responsibility"
system was instituted. Id. at 184. Decision-making authority over farmland was
allocated to household units. Id. These units had to contract to the state to
deliver a certain basic level of production at a price below the market price. Id.
However, beyond that basic level of production, the household unit was free to sell
any excess goods on the open market at whatever price the market would bear.
Id.
65.
See discussion supraPart II.
66.
Using a system of market rewards is not antithetical, even to a devout
Marxist-Leninist.
According to Marx, socialism is the first stage of communism and it
covers a very long historical period in which we must practice the principle
'to each according to his work' and combine the interests of the state, the
collective and the individual, for only thus can we arouse people's
enthusiasm for labor and develop socialist production.
DENG. supranote 57, at 333.

67.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 189.
68.
Dernelle, supranote 6. at 332.
69.
Id.
70.
John Z. Huang, An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the
People's Republic of China. 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 471, 472-73 (1995).
71.
In 1979, the PRC delineated the cities of Shenzen, Zhuhal. Shantou,
and Xlamen as special economic zones. MACKERRAS, supra note 45, at 91. In
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futures markets to encourage foreign investment. 72 Instead of
distrusting and disdaining foreign investment as they did in the
past, "Chinese leaders now view foreign trade and investment as
required instruments for the advancement of political, social, and
for the creation of a strong,
economic goals and necessary
73
modem, industrial China."
3. The Need For Legal Reform
For the "four modernizations" to succeed, the government of
the PRC realized that economic reform would have to be
accompanied by legal reform. As Deng noted, "We must use two
grasping
hands to carry on the four modernizations:
construction with one hand and grasping the legal system with
the other."74 The economic reform also required legal reform for
two reasons.
First, the shift from a centralized to a decentralized market
was expected to create a growing demand for economic legislation
7 5 When
to regulate the relationships between production units.
the economy operated as one large, vertically integrated firm,
there was little need for contract law. 76 However, for the market
to allocate resources, instead of the state's economic plan, a wellbe necessary to resolve disputes
developed contract law would
77
units.
between enterprise

1984, the PRC delineated 14 other cities as open investment areas.
"The [special economic zones were] intended to serve as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 95.

sources of foreign exchange earnings;
devices for technology transfer;
devices for managerial skills transfer;
a means for allaying the fears of the people of Hong Kong; and
laboratories for economic reform.

Id. at 92.
72.
73.
74.

Id at 94.
Demelle, supranote 6, at 332.
Shao-chuan Leng, Legal Reform in Deng's China, in REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT IN DENG'S CHINA, supranote 5, at 85, 86.

75.
76.
77.
important

Id.
See discussion supraPart III.A. 1.
Statistics on the number of economic disputes demonstrate just how
contract law would become.

Before 1979 there were no business cases ....

However, figures from

the early 1980s give some idea of just how rapid the growth of this kind of
legal case at that time was. Business cases numbered 89,494 between
1980 and 1983. including over 73,000 contract disputes.... The number
of legal documents handled by notaries [increased] from 2,797,000 in

1985.... to 5,149,000 in 1989 and 9,907,000 in 1991, the great majority

of them in each year being economic contracts.
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Second, one of the major goals of Chinese economic reform Is
to encourage foreign investment. 78 The PRC wants to become
part of the world economy. 7 9 However, to become part of the
world economy, the PRC had to offer potential trading partners
the familiar security of a legal system governed by the rule of
law.8 0 Contract law operated in a legal system subject to the
instrumentalist view of the role of law is inherently unpredictable.
In such a legal system, the law serves the policies of the state and
changes whenever the policies of the state change. 8 '
The
unpredictability of the PRC's contract law discouraged foreign
82
investment and thus impaired the economic reform efforts.
Consequently, legal reform was required not only to implement
the PRC's move towards market socialism, but also to encourage
foreign investment in support of the "four modernizations."
B. The ForeignEconomic ContractLaw
The institution of economic reforms in the PRC created a
need for a change in the system of law governing economic
transactions. To encourage foreign investment, the PRC had to
create a legal system which gave foreign investors a higher
comfort level. Further, the shift in economic control from a
centralized planning body to market forces created a more
complex economic system which required a more complex legal

MACKERRAS. supra note 45, at 144.

78.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
79.
For example, the PRC is currently lobbying for membership in the
World Trade Organization and for "most favored nation status" as a trading
partner with the United States. See Merrill Goozner. China Vies with Japan as
Trade Surplus Champ, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1996. at 1. Lesher, supra note 7.
80.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 190.
81.
Deng Xiaoping, the PRC's leader during the reform movement stated:
Democracy has to be institutionalized and written into law, so as to
make sure that Institutions and laws do not change whenever the
leadership changes. or whenever the leaders change their views.... The
trouble now is that our legal system is incomplete.

.

.

. Very often, what

leaders say is taken as law and anyone who disagrees is called a lawbreaker. That kind of law changes whenever a leader's views change. So

we must concentrate on enacting criminal and civil codes, procedural laws
and other necessary laws.
DENG, supranote 57, at 158.

82.
HENRY R. ZHENG, CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 47-48 (1988).
"[T]he lack of a reliable regulatory framework became an obstacle to the further
development of Sino-foreign commercial relations for both foreign and Chinese
businesses." Id. at 48.
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system. As a result, the PRC promulgated the Foreign Economic
Contract Law (FECL) in 1985.83
1. Scope, Principles, and Choice of Law
The first chapter sets out the general provisions of the law,
including its scope, guiding principles, and a choice of law
provision.84 The scope of the FECL encompasses economic

contracts

between

enterprises

of the

PRC

and

foreign

enterprises.8 5 On the other hand, the Economic Contract Law
(ECL), adopted in 1981,86 applies only to domestic contracts.
Unlike the ECL,8 7 the FECL is modeled after the Anglo-American
88
common law of contracts.
The principles behind the FECL are equality and mutuality of
benefit in accordance with international practice, and state
sovereignty.8 9 Article 3 provides that "[clontracts should be made
in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit,
and of achieving unanimity through consultations." 9 0 Unlike the

83.
Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China,
adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National
People's Congress on Mar. 21. 1985. reprintedin 2 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA § 850321 (University of East Asia Press & Institute
of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd. 1987) [hereinafter FECLI.
84.
Id. at arts. 3 - 5.
85.
"This Law applies to economic or trade contracts... but exclusive of
international transport contracts, concluded between enterprises or other
economic organizations of the People's Republic of China and foreign enterprises
and other economic organizations or individuals." Id. at art. 2.
86.
Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at
the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on Dec. 13, 1981,
reprinted in 1 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA §
811213.1 (University of East Asia Press & Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers)
Ltd. 1987) [hereinafter ECLI.
87.
The ECL is still dominated by the rule of man in that its goal is to
support the state's plan. See ZHENG, supranote 82, at 50. As noted by ZHENG,
Article 7 of the ECL voids contracts violating the state's economic plan. Id. at 52;
ECL, supra note 86. Under Article 27, a change in the state's plan provides a
legitimate ground for terminating or modifying a contract. ECL, supranote 86. In
contrast, the ECL mandated that the FECL be formulated separately from the ECL
with reference to the ECL and international practices. ECL, supranote 86, at art.
55.

88.
Philip J. Wilson, The Legal Structure Governing Technology Transfers
and Joint Ventures with the People's Republic of China. 3 IN'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 1.
15 (1985).
89.
Zang Yuejiao, A Brief Introduction to Recent Laws and Regulations
Concerning the Absorption of Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of
China, in CHINESE ECONOMIC LAW AND SELECTED COMPARISONS FROM THE PACIFIC RIM

3. 10 (Zhang Lixing et al. eds., 1988).
90.
FECL, supra note 83, at art. 3.
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ECL, parity of consideration is not required under the FECL. 9 1
This places the FECL closer to the concept of freedom of contract
found in Western contract law. 9 2 In the West, only bargained-for
consideration is required to form a contract, not equal beneficial
consideration.

93

Articles 4 and 9 of Chapter I express the principle of
sovereignty embodied in the FECL. Article 4 mandates that
"[c]ontracts must be made in accordance with the law of the
People's Republic of China and should not be prejudicial to the
94
public interests of society of the People's Republic of China."
Further, Article 9 states that "[c]ontracts that violate . . . the

public interest of the People's Republic of China are invalid." 9 5
Though the concept of voiding contracts that are against public
policy is found in Western contract law, 96 some scholars fear that
the "public interest" may be interpreted more expansively in the
PRC than it is in the West, implicating the instrumentalist view of
the law. 9 7 Hence, the principles of the FECL are somewhat at
odds because the use of the law as an instrument for social
change is incompatible with the freedom of contract. 98
For the first time in Chinese law, the FECL contains a
provision stipulating the principles of choice of law. 9 9 Article 5
states the following:
The parties... may choose the law applicable to the settlement of
disputes arising over the contract. In the absence of such a choice
.... the law of the country which has the closest connection with
the contract applies. In case no relevant provision is stipulated in

91.
The Economic Contract Law requires that contracts be based on the
principle of compensation of equal value. ECL. supranote 86, at art. 5.
92.
Dernelle, supra note 6, at 349.
93.
See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 259 (1891) (holding that the
forbearance from engaging in the vices of drinking, smoking, swearing, and
gambling was sufficient consideration to support a contract obligating the other
party to pay $5,000, even If the other party was not benefited thereby).
94.
FECL,supranote 83, at art. 4.
95.
I& at art. 9.
96.
For example, contracts that obligate a person to commit an Illegal act
or to violate a fiduciary duty have been found void as against public policy.
FARNSWORTH,supra note 39, at § 5.2, nn. 13, 14.
97. Given its socialist ideology, its developing economic structure, and its
unique history and culture, U.S. investors cannot assume that China's
public interest will be defined in the same way that It is In the United
States. In fact, as the discussion of political risks suggests, the more
reasonable assumption is that It will be defined differently than it would be
In a capitalist industrialized Western society.
Chew, supranote 55, at 655.
98.
See supraPart II.
99.
Yuejiao, supra note 89, at 11.
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the law of the People's Republic of China. international practice
may apply. 10 0

Though this provision may provide a certain comfort level to
foreign enterprises, it is not clear whether it allows a choice of law
as to the formation of the contract or a choice of law as to
resolving contractual disputes.' 0 1 Consequently, parties need to
be aware of the requirements of the FECL, even if they have
0 2
chosen another nation's law to govern the contract.'
2. Formation and Liability for Breach
Chapters II and III of the FECL address the formation of
contracts and the liability for breach of contract. Contracts are
created when the contractual terms are agreed upon in writing
and signed by both parties.' 0 3 Contracts made under fraud or
duress are void.' 0 4 Chapter II contains some provisions which
emphasize the state plan over freedom of contract. For example,
contracts of joint ventures involving Chinese and foreign capital,
joint natural resource explorations, or technology transfers
05
require government approval before they can be established. 1
In contrast, Chapter III's provisions concerning liability for
breach of contract seem to contain a subtle nod to the Western
ideal that contract law should serve to maximize the welfare of
society through the autonomous organization of economic
transactions. In breach of contract cases, the ECL entitles the
injured party to specific performance to insure that a breaching
party does not interfere with the state's plan.' 0 6 The requirement
of specific performance in all instances runs counter to Western
contract law, which recognizes the concept of "efficient
breach." 10 7 In contrast to the ECL, the FECL entitles the

100. FECL, supra note 83, at art. 5.
101.
[The FECLI appears to give contracting parties broad power in the
choice of law. Some members of the Chinese legal community read this provision
to permit the selection of law to be applied in the formation and performance of
the contract. A more literal reading of this provision, however, indicates merely
that the contracting parties are free to choose the procedural law to be applied in
resolving disputes. Dernelle, supra note 6, at 351.
102. Id.
103.
FECL, supra note 83, at art. 7.
104.
Id. at art. 10.

105. "Contracts subject to approval by the state as stipulated by the law or
administrative regulations of the People's Republic of China shall be established
only when approval is granted." Id. at art. 7; see also Yuejiao, supra note 89, at
13.
106. ZHENG, supranote 82, at 52; ECL, supranote 86, at art. 35.
107. In some instances, breaching a contract and paying pecuniary
damages may be economically efficient.
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breaching party to ask for remedial measures or damages. 10 8
though it does not seem to place the same emphasis on specific
performance.' 0 9 For example. under the FECL, parties may
provide in the contract what damages will be recoverable. 1 10 In
this regard, the FECL is more akin to traditional Western contract
law than the ECL.
3. Dispute Resolution
Chapter VI of the FECL recommends the resolution of
contractual disputes through a hierarchy of dispute resolution
mechanisms.
First, the FECL recommends that contractual
disputes be settled through consultation or mediation.1 1 1
Mediation is the most popular form of dispute resolution in the
PRC 112 due to its philosophical" 13 and political 14 support and
1 15
because of the lack of a well developed legal system.

The party in breach may gain enough from the breach to have a net
benefit, even though that party compensates the injured party for resulting
loss, calculated according to the subjective preferences of the injured
party. If this is so. nonperformance and the consequent reallocation of
resources Is socially desirable, and economic theory not only sanctions but
encourages breach.
FARNSWORTH, supranote 39. at 847.
108.
The non-breaching party "is entitled to ask the party in default to adopt
reasonable remedial measures or claim for damages. If the losses suffered by the
other party are not paid in full after the remedial measures are taken, that other
party retains the right to claim for damages." FECL, supranote 83, at art. 18.
109.
Demelle. supranote 6, at 356.
110.
"The parties may agree upon in a contract that a certain amount of
liquidated damages shall be paid to the other party if one party violates the
contractual obligations." FECL, supranote 83, at art. 20.
111.
I& at arts. 37, 38.
112.
It has been estimated that 90 percent of all civil cases arising in 1981
were mediated. LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 85 (Ralph H. Folsom &
John H. Minan eds.. 1989). Of the 40 million disputes mediated since 1981.
approximately 80 percent were settled. Id.
113.
Under Confucian philosophy, social conflict Is seen to interfere with the
attainment of an individual's highest potential. Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at
157. "The transcendent harmony of the natural world has inner aspects, forming
a moral law felt by every sensitive human. People fulfill their highest potential
when they conform their lives to that moral order and live In harmony with It.
When they do so, there is no need for coercion to right behavior." Id
114. The Communist party supports mediation because "it exemplifies
communal obligations and rejects formal judicial mechanisms which traditionally
have been characterized as pre-revolutionary Institutions for class manipulation."
LAW INTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supranote 112, at 86.
115. There are several practical considerations that explain why mediation
Is the dispute resolution method of choice in the PRC: 1) the shortage of
attorneys, 2) the limited availability of discovery, 3) the court's lack of Injunctive
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Mediation can be either formal or informal and is not necessarily
1 16
compulsory, and requires the consent of both parties.
However,
formally
mediated
agreements
are
judicially
117
enforceable.
Should the parties to a contractual dispute choose to forego
consultation and mediation, or if consultation and mediation fail
to bring about a resolution to the dispute, the FECL allows
parties to take their grievances to arbitration. 1 8 Arbitration is a
popular form of dispute resolution for foreign enterprises doing
business in China. I 19 The FECL makes arbitration attractive to
foreign enterprises because it provides for a "substantial measure
of party autonomy." 2 0 First, arbitration can be held in either the
PRC 12 1 or abroad. 12 2 The ability of the parties to determine
where arbitration will occur has a substantial impact on
individual autonomy.' 2 3 Second, parties need not attempt to
12 4
have their dispute mediated before proceeding to arbitration.
Third, the parties can choose which forum's law is to govern the
arbitration.' 2 5 Even if the law of the PRC is chosen, international
26
custom may still apply. 1

or contempt powers. 4) the lack of personal liability insurance, and 5) the
prevalence of under-trained, mediation-oriented judges. Id.
116.
Id. at 86-87.
117.
Id. at 87.
118.
FECL, supra note 83, at art. 37.
119.
Discussing foreign enterprises doing business in the PRC, attorney
John T. Kuzmik with the U.S. law firm of Denton Hall stated, "We almost always
suggest that you put in the contract an arbitration clause." Solving Disputes in
China Starts with the Contract ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995. available in 1995
WL-WSJA 2133591.
120. James A. R. Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang, Chinese Methods of Resolving
International Trade, Investment, and Maritime Disputes, in LAw IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supranote 112, at 148, 162.
121.
The major arbitration commissions in the PRC, the Foreign and
Economic Trade Commission and the Maritime Arbitration Commission, are the
two primary means for resolving Sino-foreign trade disputes. LAW INTHE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supranote 112. at 124.
122.
If arbitration is held in the PRC, the rules of the Chinese arbitral
Institution must apply. Tang Houzhi, Arbitration - A Method Used by China to
Settle Foreign Trade and Economic Disputes, in LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, supra note 112, at 146. However, if arbitration is held abroad, the rules of
another permanent arbitral body (such as the U.N. Commission on International
Trade Law) may be used. Id.
123. Nafziger & Jiafang, supranote 120, at 148. 162.
124. FECL, supranote 83, at art. 37.
125. Id. at art. 5.
126.
Id.
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As a last resort, parties may take their case to court. 1 2 7 The
judiciary of the PRC is divided into three categories: the local
courts, the special courts, and the Supreme People's Court. 128

The local courts and the Supreme People's Court form a
hierarchy of judicial review. 129 The local courts include the
basic-level people's courts, the intermediate people's courts, and
the higher people's courts. 130 The basic-level courts function on
the city, county, and district level and act only as courts of
original jurisdiction. 13 1 The basic-level courts have economic
divisions to hear commercial disputes.' 3 2 The intermediate
people's courts function on the prefecture, autonomous region,
and city level, directly under the control of the central
government. 133 The intermediate court has original jurisdiction
over disputes involving foreign persons.' 3 4 The higher people's
court functions at the provincial level and acts as both a trial
court and a court of appeals.13 5 The Supreme People's Court has
administrative jurisdiction over the other courts, original
jurisdiction in designated cases, and appellate jurisdiction over
6
the higher and specialty courts. 13
The PRC also has specialty courts which exclusively handle
certain kinds of cases. 13 7 Included within the specialty courts
are the economic courts.13 8
The economic courts have
jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign enterprises and
strictly domestic disputes.' 3 9 The economic courts also hear
domestic criminal cases. 140 The economic courts were created for
the same reasons that general legal reform was undertaken in the
PRC:
to provide a forum that would produce "socialist
modernization" and to encourage foreign investment.141

127.
"In cases where an arbitration clause has not been stipulated in a
contract or an arbitration agreement has not been made afterwards, the parties
may take their case to the people's court." Id. at art. 38.
128. LAW INTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supranote 112, at 174.
129.
THOMAs CHIU ETAL., LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE PRC 71 (1991).
130.
LAW INTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supranote 112, at 178-79.
131.
1d at 169-70.
132.
Id. at 169.
133.
I& at 170.
134.
ld.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
For example, there are traffic police courts that handle only civil auto
accident cases. Id. at 169.
138.
Paul A. Allen & Marc S. Palay, Economtc Courts, in LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. supranote 112, at 183.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141.
Id. at 184; see discussion supraPart III.A.3.
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The FECL disfavors judicial proceedings. Parties only have
access to the people's court if the contract did not provide for
arbitration and the parties could not agree on arbitration after
the dispute arose. 14 2 It is not clear whether the people's court is
the only judicial remedy under the FECL. 14 3 The FECL provides
that parties "may take their case to the people's court."14 4 The

current practice supports the interpretation that parties may

14 5
choose to settle their disputes in other judicial forums.

IV. RECENT SINO-FOREIGN DISPUTES
Despite the FECL's pro-Western slant, a series of highly
publicized contractual disputes involving Chinese and foreign
enterprises during the early 1990s caused concern that the
instrumentalist view of law still governs Sino-foreign economic
transactions in the PRC. The two disputes symbolizing the
international business community's concern over contractual
enforcement in the PRC involved McDonald's Corporation and
Lehman Brothers Commercial Corporation.1 4 6
Despite the
tremendous amount of international publicity generated by these
disputes and their impact on the business community, their
resolution did little to resolve the debate as to the role of law in
the PRC.
A. McDonald's
McDonald's had good reason to be optimistic when it opened
its first restaurant in Beijing in April of 1992.147 The corporation
thought it had a twenty-year lease in arguably the best location in
China.1 4 8 The largest McDonald's restaurant in existence, 149 on

142. FECL, supranote 83, at art. 38.
143. ZHENG, supranote 82, at 67.
144.
FECL, supranote 83, at art. 38 (emphasis added).
145. Henry Zheng based this assertion on reports that the jurisdiction of
New York. Japan, and Hong Kong courts had been accepted in Sino-foreign
contracts. ZHENG, supranote 82, at 67.

146.

Jeffrey Hoffman, U.S. Firms Pursue Market in China Despite News of

Problems FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 9, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL

5621387.
147. The Beijing restaurant was the third opened in the PRC. Janet Snyder,
McDonald'sDraws the Crowds in Beyjing Debut, Reuters, April 23, 1992, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File.
148. The restaurant was located near Tiananmen Square on Wangfujing
street, the busiest shopping street in China. Id. "Every day more than 400,000
people-roughly the population of Luxembourg-stream past the comer where
McDonald's Beijing is nestled." Id.
149. The restaurant had 29 cash registers and a 700-seat capacity. Id.
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opening day it set a chain record by serving approximately
40,000 customers.' 5 0 Despite this auspicious start, McDonald's
optimism was belied when two-and-a-half years later, it was
evicted to make way for a massive shopping complex.' 5 ' The
eviction captured significant attention in the international
business community. McDonald's complained that it was a party
to a binding contract.15 2 As a result, reporters described the
eviction as an example of the PRC's unwillingness to enforce
53
contractual obligations. 1
However, in retrospect, the McDonald's dispute added little
to the role of law debate in the PRC. First, there were questions
as to the validity of McDonald's lease.
McDonald's began
negotiating with the Beijing authorities for the Beijing site in
1989.1-5" However, the PRC did not formally recognize the right of
foreign entities to lease state-owned property until 1990.155
Consequently, it has been asserted that McDonald's only had an
arbitrary arrangement with the Beijing authorities, which

150. Nicholas D. Kristof, "BillionsServed" (andThat Was Without China). N.Y.
TIMES, April 24. 1992, at A4.
151.
Oriental Plaza was designed as a residential, commercial, and office
complex, which would cover 108.000 square meters in downtown Beijing at a cost
of about $1.2 billion. Ted Plaker. Is This the End of a Beautiful Friendship?.S.
CHINA MORNING PosT. Nov. 27. 1994. at 6. available in LEXIS. World Library.
Schina File.
152. The Wangfujing McDonald's restaurant issued a statement saying. "We
believe we have a legal right to be at this location." Id.
153. "[Slerious investors likewise view this apparent breach of contract as a
frightening indication that China's business climate is inhospitable to the concept
of the rule-of-law." Id. "When the Chinese government recently ordered
McDonald's. barely into a 20-year lease, to relocate its profitable restaurant near
the center of Beijing, the eviction notice was heard around the business world....
[The McDonald's incident has fueled skepticism about the wisdom of doing
business and investing in China." Stanley B. Lubman, Doing Business with China:
A Big Mac Attack?. TULSA WORLD, Jan. 11, 1995, at N13, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Busdfl File.
154. Plafker. supra note 151.
155. "Chinese law did not provide for a land-use lease, so McDonald's
'couldn't lose its lease.' " Toh Han Shih, Know the Rules in China, Otherwise Fill
the Gap. Bus. TIMES. Nov. 25. 1995, at 4, availablein 1995 WL 8502830. The PRC
amended Its Constitution to permit the transfer of the use of land in 1988.
However, it was not until 1990 that the Interim Regulations Concerning the
Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-Owned Land in the
Urban Areas, and the Interim Measures for the Administration of the
Foreign-Invested Development and Management of Tracts of Land were
promulgated. It was these laws that formally gave foreign investors the right to
acquire the right to use property by entering into a lease with a lessor. See
Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Grant
and Assignment of the Right to Use State Land in Urban Areas, Act of May 24.
1990, art. 28, 2 China L. for Foreign Bus. Reg. (CCH) P 14-716, at 18,665.
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therefore could be arbitrarily breached. 15 6 In contrast, foreign
enterprises which entered into similar agreements based on
recent laws regarding land use in Beijing were able to reach
relatively quick out-of-court settlements with the Beijing
authorities
in
the dispute over the shopping center
development. 157
Second, the merits of McDonald's complaint were never
formally heard.1 5 8 McDonald's chose not to pursue legal action
inside or outside of the PRC.' 5 9
Consequently, because of
questions about the validity of McDonald's lease and the lack of
public resolution, the McDonald's dispute failed to be a definitive

example of the operation of law from an instrumentalist
perspective.
B. Lehman Brothers
Similarly, the resolution of the Lehman Brothers dispute

provided little insight into the question of whether the PRC
resolves Sino-foreign contract disputes according to the rule of

law.

In December of 1994, the investment bank Lehman

Brothers filed suit in New York against China National Metals &
Minerals Import & Export Corporation (Minmetals) and its Hong
Kong subsidiary, Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals

156.
Michael Michalak, Deputy Director of the Economic Affairs Unit of the
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs in the U.S. Department of State, Remarks
to the Southeast Michigan-China Network (1995) in China in Transition - The
Impact at Home and Abroad, 4 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 241,286 (1995).
157. Michael Michalak cited Shakeys as one of the firms that was able to
obtain a quick settlement. Id.
158. See fid.
159.
Donald Whaley, the president of McDonald's China Development
Company. issued the following press release regarding the dispute with the PRC:
In response to your Dec. 2 page-one article that mentioned McDonald's
operations in China and the current situation surrounding our Wangfujing
restaurant in Beijing.
As it relates to McDonald's, I would like to say we absolutely are
committed to a long-term strategy of growth in China. In fact, ve will open
our second restaurant in Shanghai and our seventh restaurant in Beijing
this month, bringing the total in China to 27.
We are not considering legal action regarding our Wangfujing
restaurant. We have an excellent relationship with the Beijing government
and look forward to that relationship continuing for many years. Also we
expect an amicable resolution will be found regarding our Wangfujing
restaurant.
Letter to the Editor, McDonald's Intends to Stay in China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
1995, at 9.
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Trading (Non-Ferrous).1 60 Lehman Brothers was attempting to
recover more than $44 million lost in foreign-exchange
transactions allegedly entered into between Lehman Brothers and
Non-Ferrous and guaranteed by Minmetals. 161
At the time, observers saw the case as a referendum on the
PRC's
creditworthiness.' 6 2
The international
business
community's concern was that state-owned companies like
Minmetals would not stand behind the obligations of their
offshore units. 16 3 However, the New York court dismissed the
case against Minmetals, holding that a guarantee Lehman
Brothers had received had not been signed by anyone with the
authority to bind Minmetals and that the letters of undertaking
which Lehman received from Minmetals did not constitute
guarantees that it would back Non-Ferrous' trades. 164 Instead of
implicating the legal system of the PRC, the Lehman Brothers
dispute implicated Lehman Brothers' ability to document its
65
transactions. 1

Consequently, neither of the two Sino-foreign disputes that

symbolized the international business community's concern over
the PRC's enforcement of contractual obligations provided any
significant insight into the role of law in the PRC. Despite their

widespread publicity, neither dispute helped to resolve the
question of whether Sino-foreign contractual disputes in the PRC
can be resolved according to the rule of law.

160.
Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals. Int'l. 11995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) l 98.841, 1995 WL 380119 (S.D.N.Y. June 26,
1995).
161.
Id.
162.
For example, Standard and Poor's intimated that it might lower the
PRC's credit rating over the Lehman Brothers dispute and other incidents.
Analysts said the [Standard and Poor's] lawyer's language was unusually
strong given that Standard & Poor's tends to issue low-key statements.
It's definitely a shot in front of the bow," said Michael Baer, senior vice
president at the London branch of Bank Julius Baer & Co. Mr. Baer said
that if Standard & Poor's were to lower its rating for China sovereign debt
"that would be quite a big blow for China" in its effort to raise capital
internationally to fund infrastructure projects.
Guyot, supra note 2.
163. As a result of the dispute, "Westem financial houses reassessed their
China risks while some even cut credit available to Chinese state-owned
companies."
Craig S. Smith, Lehman Bros. Legal Setback May Hurt Firm's
Remaining Business in China,WALL ST. J., June 30, 1995, at B5.
164. Lehman Bros. v. Minmetals, [19951 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,064.
165. The former head of credit at a competing U.S. investment bank stated,
"It has already been discounted in the market. What it shows is that Lehman had
a documentation problem." Henry Sender, Beying: Sloppy Joes, FAR E. ECON.
REV., July 13, 1995, at 82, available in 1995 WL-FEER 9081058.
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DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW

To assess the PRC's ability to implement the rule of law in
the governance of Sino-foreign economic transactions, it is
necessary to define the institutional characteristics that are
essential components of the rule of law. 1 66 These institutional
characteristics can then be compared to the current principles of
legal organization in the PRC, thus exposing obstacles to and
potential strategies for achieving the rule of law.
A. The InstitutionalVersus the Values Approach
Professor Geoffrey Walker 16 7 has identified two possible
approaches for defining the rule of law: an institutional approach
and a values approach. 168
Professor Walker's institutional
16 9
approach defines the rule of law by examining the institutions
designed to safeguard it in countries 170 where the rule of law is
commonly thought to prevail. 17 1 By focusing on the immediate
purpose the institution was created to serve, common principles
of legal organization begin to surface. 1 72 Countries that adhere to
173
these principles are said to observe the rule of law.

In contrast, the values approach defines the rule of law

according to the broad objective that it is thought to serve in
modem Western society. 17 4 For example,

The function of the legislative in a free society under the rule of law

is to create and maintain the conditions which will uphold the

166. Defining the rule of law according to institutional characteristics found
in countries where the rule of law is commonly recognized to prevail focuses on
the principles of legal organization of society. GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE
OF LAW: FOUNDAION OF CONSITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 9-11 (1988). Using common
institutional characteristics to define the rule of law is preferable to using
common values because it avoids clouding the definition with cultural bias or
ethnocentricity. Id. at 12.
167.
Professor Walker is Professor of Law at the University of Queensland,
Australia.
168. WALKER, supra note 166, at 9.
169. Professor Walker's analysis includes examining the principles which
dictate how the rule of law is to be safeguarded, the institutions that actually
safeguard the rule of law, and the procedures these institutions use for that
purpose. Id.
170. As examples, Professor Walker uses the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, and New Zealand. Id- at 10.
171. Professor Walker recognizes the circularity of this approach. Id at 9.
That is, by defining the rule of law in terms of the means by which it is
safeguarded in a particular country, he assumes that the rule of law prevails in
that country. Id.
172. Id. at 10.
173. I& at 23.
174. I& at 11.
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dignity of man as an individual. This dignity requires not only the
recognition of his civil and political rights but also the
establishment of the social, economic, educational and cultural
conditions which are essential to the full development of his
17 5
personality.

The problem with this approach is that it inseparably links
176
the rule of law with liberal democratic free-market societies.
"The rule of law becomes confused with social justice, democracy,
human rights . . . and itself lacks the sharpness to serve any
useful purpose." 17 7 Professor Walker suggests that it is wrong to
presume that a recognizable form of the rule of law could not
exist in a theocratic or secular-but-socialist society, where the
legal system might not be structured around the development of
the individual. 178 Consequently. Professor Walker chooses to
define the rule of law according to the institutional approach.
B. InstitutionalCharacteristics

Using the institutional approach, Professor Walker found a
set of principles of legal organization common to many countries
ascribing to the rule of law. 17 9
Using Professor Walker's

principles to determine whether the rule of law is dominant in a
society demonstrates that a country's organization as a liberal.

175. Report of Committee I: The Legislative and the Rule of Law. INrTL CONG.
OF JuRIsTS, NEW DELHI. INDIA. Clause I. (1959) reprintedin INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
OF JURISTS. THE RULE OF LAW INAFREE SOcIETY 4 (New Delhi 1959).
176. Icl. at 12.
177. M. D. A. Freeman, The Rule of Law - Conservative. Liberal. Marxist and
Neo-Marxst: WVherein Lies the Attraction?, in PERESTROIKA AND THE RULE OF LAW 37.

43 (W. E. Butler ed., 1991).
178. As an example. Professor Walker notes:
The purpose of Islamic legal thought is ... to discover the precise terms of
the divine will as expressed through the Qur'an and through the sayings
and actions of the Prophet Mohammed ....
[The full development of
individual capacities is irrelevant.
... But It would be wrong to conclude that a recognizable form of the
rule of law could not exist in a strictly Islamic society. The sharly'a
(religious) criminal law, for example, imposes stringent requirements on
the conduct of criminal trials, particularly in relation to evidence and the
burden of proof.... It is certain that the values that gave rise to shariy'a
criminal procedure had nothing to do with Western ideas of individual
rights.... But if the result of these rules and of this juristic-theological
thinking is that persons accused of a crime do in practice have an
opportunity to defend themselves and that the innocent have a reasonable
prospect of going free, what right have we to deny that the rule of law is, to
that extent, a going concern in that country?
WALKER, supranote 166. at 12-13.

179.

Id.atIO-11.
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free-market democracy is not a prerequisite to the rule of law.18 0
As long as a society observes these principles in "letter and
spirit," it is a society under the rule of law regardless of the
reason for observing such principles. 181
1. Laws Against Private and Public Coercion
One necessary characteristic of a society governed by the
rule of law is that laws must exist that protect individuals from
private coercion. 18 2 The state must ensure that individuals will
not "break the rules that all should see are in their interest as
long as all obey." 18 3
Thus the government protects the
individual's interest in autonomous choices.
According to
capitalist theory, this leads to wealth-maximizing behavior for the
individual and for society. 18 4 However, the mere existence of laws

designed to protect the individual from private coercion is

insufficient. To escape Hobbes' state of nature, the government
85

must be capable of enforcing its laws against private coercion.1
The rule of law depends on "the existence of effective government
18 6
capable of maintaining law and order."
Similarly, the rule of law provides a check on the government
by preventing it from exercising arbitrary power. 18 7 Hence the
rule of law advances the goal of individual freedom in two ways:
by restraining private coercive action and by restraining the

govenment.' 88 Like the prohibition on coercive private action,
the "government under the law" principle must be enforced.' 8 9
There must be effective procedures and institutions to prevent
the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.' 90 The principle of
180.

Ia at 23.

181.

Id.

182.
"Rule of law must mean freedom from private lawlessness and
anarchy." Id. at 24.
183. Segall, supra note 28, at 996.
184.
See discussion supraPart II. However, in order to implicate the rule of
law, the purpose behind the existence of laws to protect individuals from private
coercion need not be to support a capitalist economy. See WALKER, supra note
166, at 23.
185.
WALKER, supranote 166, at 28.
186.
Report of Committee L The Executive and the Rule of Law, I'rL CONG.
OF JuRISTs, NEW DELHI, INDIA (1959), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOcIETY 6 (New Delhi 1959).

187.
"[T]he rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based
on the exercise by person in authority of wide. arbitrary, or discretionary powers
of constraint." AM. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188 (9th

ed. 1939).
188.
Segall, supra note 28, at 996.
189. WALKER, supranote 166, at 29.
190.
An example of such procedures and institutions is judicial review of
executive action. Id.
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government under law cannot be effective unless the individual
has legal recourse and the possibility of enforcement against the
sovereign. 191
2. Normativism
One of the main principles underlying the rule of law is that
the law must be normative-that is, "the law should be such that
people will be able to be guided by it." 19 2 There are three
components to the requirement of normativism: certainty,
generality, and equality. 19 3 Certain laws provide guidance to
society by being prospective, open, clear, and relatively stable. 19 4
Furthermore, the certainty principle curtails the arbitrary power
of the courts and the police by ensuring that laws are not
excessively vague.' 95 The generality principle ensures that laws
are not particularized to individuals. 19 6
Unless laws are
generalized, they do not provide norms for behavior, 19 7 but
instead represent "a series of patternless exercises of state
power." 19 8 Finally, the corollary of normativism is equality. 199
The idea of equality means that the law is applied to everyone
equally. 20 0 When the law is not applied to everyone equally, Its

191.
Professor Walker cites the failure of the pre-constitutional codifications
of eighteenth-century Prussia and Austria to establish the rule of law. Id. Though
the codes were "prospective, clear, general and predictable," because no
independent courts existed, there was no check on the sovereign's arbitrary
exercise of power. Id.
192.
Segall, supranote 28, at 995 (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and
the Virtue, in THE ArHORrTy OF LAW 213 (1979)).
193.
It is the existence of certainty, generality, and equality that enable the
law to guide its subjects. WALKER, supranote 166, at 51.
194.
I. at 25.
195. As an example of an excessively vague law, Professor Walker cites
Article 16 of the Soviet Criminal Code which prohibited all "socially dangerous
acts." Id. The power to determine what acts were "socially dangerous" was left to
those who enforced it, inviting arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. As the
U.S. Supreme Court noted with regard to vague laws, "It would certainly be
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully
detained, and who should be set at large." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
221 (1876).
196.
WALKER, supranote 166, at 25.
197.
Id.
198.
Id. In a free market economy, generality renders the outcome of
economic transactions predictable, encouraging mutually beneficial exchanges,
See FRANz NEUMANN. THE RULE OF LAW 213 (1986); see also discussion supra Part
II.
199. WALKER, supranote 166, at 51.
200.
Professor Dicey defined equality as follows:
In England the idea of legal equality, or the universal subjection of all
classes to one law administered by ordinary courts, has been pushed to its
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value as a guide to behavior is diminished, as is society's respect
20 1
for the law.
3. Independent Judiciary and Legal Profession
An independent judiciary has long been recognized as a
requisite institutional characteristic of a society governed by the
rule of law. 20 2 In the context of the rule of law, one of the
traditional functions of the judiciary is to review legislative and
executive acts. 20 3 Hence, the judiciary serves as the institution
which ensures that the principle of government under the law is
enforced. 20 4 However, if the judiciary is not independent, it

cannot adequately perform this role. 205 Two common structural

safeguards of judicial independence are security of tenure 20 6 and
20 7
protection from reduction in remuneration during that tenure.
According to Professor Walker, an independent judiciary
20 8
must also be accompanied by an independent legal profession.

utmost limit. With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a
constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every
act done without legal justification as any other citizen.
DICEY, supranote 187, at 193.
See WALKER. supranote 166. at 26 (discussing the increased likelihood
201.
of compliance with laws known to be equally applicable to everyone).
"'[There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
202.
legislative and executive powers.' " THE FEDERALIST No. 78. at 466 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) (quoting Montesquieu's SPiRrr OF LAws); see
Charles de Secondat. baron de Montesquieu. THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 163 (J.V.
Prichard ed. Rev. vol. & Thomas Nugent trans., 1991) (1748).
KEITH, supranote 24, at 182.
203.
See discussion supraPart V.B. 1.
204.
It has been noted that:
205.
[Tihe power of the law, and of the judiciary, is in its independence.... The
power of the law and of those who administer It is in the very fact that they
are not competing with the more partisan powers of the executive and even
Such independence of the judicial department' may
the legislature.
indeed be regarded as the very definition of the 'rule of law': it is certainly
If the law and the judiciary come under
an important part of it.
government control, they cease to be necessary as such; if courts become a
part of political struggles, they merely simulate parliament and parties and
lose their function. Either way, the partisan administration of law is in
fact the perversion of law, and the denial of the rule of law.
WALKER, supra note 166, at 30 (quoting R Dahrendorf, A Confusion of Powers:

Politics and the Rule of Law, 40 MOD. L. REv. 1, 9 (1977)).

206.

"[Niothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary's] firmness and

Independence as permanency in office[;] this quality may therefore be justly
regarded as an indispensable ingredient in [the] constitution." THE FEDERALIST.
supranote 202, at 466.
207. WALKER, supra note 166, at 31.
Id. at 36.
208.
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An independent legal profession is necessary to provide adequate
defense to the accused in

a

criminal trial. 20 9

Furthermore,

should the judiciary become tainted by the influence of either the
legislature or the executive, an independent bar can remind the
judiciary of its role in enforcing the government under law
2 10
principle and "generally keep the rule of law alive."
4. Natural Justice
Courts in societies governed by the rule of law share two
common characteristics.
First, they observe the principle of
natural justice. 2 1 1 Procedurally, natural justice requires that the
tribunal be unbiased, that both sides of the case be heard, and
that the court be open to the public. 2 12 The function of natural
justice is "to legitimate, to ensure the acceptability, of the court
as a dispute-settling mechanism by requiring rational and evenhanded procedures that demonstrate a concern for individuals
and for the individual's problems." 2 13 In that sense, the principle
of natural justice is closely tied to the principle of judicial
independence in that both increase societal respect for and belief
in the law. Second, courts in nations governed by the rule of law
are accessible. 2 14 If courts are inaccessible, natural justice can
never be administered. An individual's ability to vindicate one's
legal rights is illusory if hampered by long delays or excessive
costs.

2 15

Like the courts, the enforcement of laws must be impartial in
a nation governed by the rule of law. 2 16 The courts, while
exercising a great deal of discretion, must be unbiased to further
the goals of predictability and of instilling a respect for and belief
in the law. However, the courts are not the only body with wide
discretion. Even in a society with clear and precise laws, some
2 17
discretion will exist on the part of those who enforce the law.

209. Id.
210. Professor Walker cites the legal profession's role in India during the
"Gandhi emergency." Id. at 37. There, attorneys "continued to press for habeas
corpus on behalf of thousands of detainees, despite increasingly obvious risks to
the lawyers themselves." Id.

211.

Professor Walker notes that the principle of natural justice dates back

to ancient times. Id. at 37. "Does our law judge a man without first giving him a
hearing... ?" I& at 412 n.151 (quoting John 7:51).
212.
Id. at 37.
213.
Id. at 38.
214.
Id. at 40.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 40-41.
217.
"The police decide which laws to enforce and whom to arrest.
Prosecutors decide whether to bring charges and for which offenses. Prosecutors
also may elect to accept or reject offers of guilty pleas and to make or withhold
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That discretion "should not be allowed to pervert the law" in a
2 18
society governed by the rule of law.
5. Social Values and an Attitude of Legality
There must be an attitude of legality for the rule of law to

prosper. 219 The source of the values that the rule of law protects
is to be "found in the patterns of behavior and belief of the
people, and their crystallization through the institutions of the
legal system is a continuous process." 220 Without an attitude of
legality, the institutions that safeguard the rule of law can break
down or be subverted.
Supporting the attitude of legality is the principle that
society's values must remain reasonably in accord with the law.
In a society governed by the rule of law, the law must reflect
society's values. 22 1 Otherwise, respect for and belief in the law
will be diminished. 22 2
The mechanism for ensuring this
alignment in Western nations is ordinarily two-party or multiparty democracy. 2 2 3 However, any system will work as long as it
2 24
allows individuals to be heard without fear of reprisal.

VI.

ASSESSING THE RULE OF LAW IN THE

PRC

The application of Professor Walker's principles to the
current legal organization of the PRC indicates that both
structural and sociopolitical obstacles block the operation of the
FECL according to the rule of law. Given time and the proper
motivation, the structural deficiencies can be remedied. Further,
although the sociopolitical obstacles are of greater concern, at
least theoretically, these too can be overcome through the
influence of economic development and the power of market
forces.

recommendations of sentence. In all of these respects, the exercise of discretion
is virtually uncontrolled." PETERW. Low ETAL., CRIMINAL LAW 65 (2d ed. 1986).

218.

WALKER, supranote 166, at 41.

219.

Id.

220.

Id.

221.

Id at 27.

222.

The societal frustration with the law which results when the law is not

In accord with society's values can find expression in "arbitrary and lawless
actions." Id.
223. Id.
224. As an alternate system, Professor Walker cites the Saudi Arabian
procedure whereby any subject of the kingdom can obtain an audience with the
king to air legal grievances or debate the interpretation of a particular applicable
law. Id. at 28.
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A. Analysis of the StructuralObstacles
Like other Communist countries that have attempted to
implement the rule of law, the PRC is plagued by several
structural deficiencies, most notably a shortage of trained legal
personnel and the absence of precedential judicial decisions.
However, because of the limited scope of the FECL, these
deficiencies could be remedied without dramatically altering the
legal system of the PRC.
1. The Shortage of Trained Legal Personnel
The shortage of trained legal personnel in the PRC implicates
several of Professor Walker's principles of legal organization
essential to the rule of law. Despite having a population of over
one billion, the PRC has only about 380,000 legal personnel,
leading to long delays in bringing a legal action. 2 25 The shortage
of legal personnel implicates the principles of natural justice, and
of an independent judiciary and legal profession. The principle of
natural justice requires that individuals have the right to have
their disputes adjudicated in an even-handed way before an
unbiased tribunal. 226 The existence of long delays such as those
necessarily created by the shortage of legal personnel in the PRC
makes that right illusory. 2 2 7 The lack of legal personnel in the
PRC also implicates the principle of an independent judiciary and
legal profession. The judiciary and legal profession ensure that
the principle of government under the law is enforced by
reviewing legislative and executive acts. 22 8 A shortage in judges
and attorneys results in a shortage in oversight.
Aside from being relatively few in number, judges in China
often have relatively little legal education. 2 29 This deficiency
implicates Professor Walker's certainty principle in that an undertrained judiciary will be less likely to apply laws uniformly such
that individuals may be guided by them. 23 0 Further, an undertrained judiciary will be less capable of reviewing the acts of other
23 l
governmental bodies, implicating the independence principle.

225. Leng, supranote 74, at 90. One reason mediation is the most popular
form of dispute resolution in China is because the shortage of legal personnel
makes the courts inaccessible. See discussion supraPart III.B.3.
226.
See discussion supraPart V.B.4.
227.
See discussion supraPart V.1.4.
228.
See discussion supraPart V.B.3.
229. MACKERRAS, supranote 45,at 146.
230.
See discussion supraPart V.1.2.
231.
It has been said that "iludicial independence is inseparable from
judicial competence." William W. Schwarzer. Democracy's Dawn: American Judges
and the Rule ofLaw Abroad, 31 No. 4 JUDGES'J., 34, 36 (1992).

19971

CONTRACT LAW IN THE PRC

Nevertheless, the shortage of legal personnel is not a fatal
flaw in the context of governing Sino-foreign disputes. First, the
number of attorneys in the PRC is growing. 2 3 2 Second, the FECL
2 33
does not seem to bind parties to domestic courts.

Consequently, parties can choose to go outside the legal system

of the PRC to take advantage of certain, accessible, and
independent foreign judiciaries.
However. even if parties choose to adjudicate their dispute
outside of the PRC's legal system, the victorious party still has to
To improve the
enforce its award in a Chinese court.2 3 4
responsiveness of the PRC's legal system to foreign enterprises
and thus attract more foreign investment, the PRC should
consider splitting the special economic courts into those with
jurisdiction over domestic matters only and those with
jurisdiction over Sino-foreign disputes.
The concept of adopting specialized courts to handle
business litigation in order to attract new investment is not new.
In the United States, four states have created specialized5
23
business courts while ten others are considering the concept.
Furthermore, this was the original goal behind the creation of the
236
economic courts in the PRC.
However, the existing economic courts in the PRC have
23 7
jurisdiction over both domestic and foreign disputes.
Consequently, these courts hear disputes adjudicated according
to both the ECL and the FECL. Because the philosophical

232. The number of attorneys in the PRC grew from about 3,000 in 1980 to
almost 44,000 in 1989. MACKERRAS. supra note 45. at 146. "Although at present
there are still fewer than 100,000 lawyers in China (a ratio of 12,000:1, against
8,000:1 in Japan and 360:1 in the [United States]). Beijing has set the goal of
150,000 by the turn of the century. and twice that number by 2010." Gerald
Chen. The "Civil Society" is Expanding by the Day: Civil Rights on the Mainland,
WINDOW (HONG KONG), Nov. 8, 1996. available in 1996 WL 12924330.
233.
See discussion supraPart III.B.3.

234.

"Chinese arbitration isn't the worst thing in the world.... But if you

get an award, you're stuck enforcing the awards in Chinese courts. Sometimes
local pressures will lead a court to avoid or delay the execution of an arbitration
award." Solving Disputes in ChinaStarts with the Contract,supra note 119, at 8.
235.
New York, Delaware, Illinois, and North Carolina each have created
specialized business courts. ACCA Endorses Specialized Business Courts, METRO.
CORP. COUN., Aug. 1996. at 32, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Mcc File.
California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin have considered or are considering creating
such courts. Id.; see also Susan D. Etkind, A Connecticut Commercial Court?.,
CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1997, at 3, availablein LEXIS, Legnew Library, Clt File.
236.
Gregory S. Kolton, CopyrightLaw and the People's Courts in the People's
Republic of China-A Review and Critique of China'sIntellectual Property Courts, 17
U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 415. 428 (1996).
237. See discussion supraPart III.B.3.
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foundations for these two bodies of law are so different, 2 38 some
advantages of specialization are lost. For example, judges in the
economic courts are more likely to resolve contractual disputes
using traditional Chinese conceptions of the role of law rather
than according to the rule of law. 2 39 As a result, the economic

courts

have not been

particularly

popular with

foreign

enterprises. 2 40 By dividing the economic courts into foreign and
domestic courts, the PRC would reduce the number of judges
eligible to adjudicate Sino-foreign disputes. Having a smaller
pool of judges to educate makes it easier to overcome traditional
Chinese conceptions of the role of law and to implement the rule
of law. Further, such a division would be consistent with the
division of contract law in the PRC between the ECL and FECL.
Another drawback to the economic courts is that the judges
may not be adequately trained. 24 1 The foreign economic courts
could be staffed and trained on an accelerated schedule
concerning the details of the FECL and the precepts of the rule of
law. This process would then establish a relatively more familiar
forum for foreign enterprises without altering the rest of the
PRC's legal system. Creating foreign economic courts to
adjudicate Sino-foreign disputes would make the dispensation of
justice in the PRC "faster, more consistent, more efficient, more
predictable and of a higher quality, resulting in a greater
242
confidence in [the PRC's] judicial system."

238.

See discussion supraPart III.B.

239.

According to Confucian philosophy, strict adherence to the letter of the

law is eschewed in favor of deference to the parties' relationship and maintaining
the moral order. See discussion infra Part VI.B.1. Judges in the PRC's economic
courts seem to adhere to this philosophy when adjudicating cases rather than to
the rule of law. "From the perspective of most of the economic court judges we
interviewed, contract enforcement Is not best accomplished by too rigid an
insistence on the letter of the law and the precise terms of the contract. The letter
must be softened by deference to the relationship of the party and the moral
demands of accommodation." Cheng & Rosette, supranote 49, at 225.
240. For example. over 1,000 economic courts were created from the mid1980s through 1989. Allen & Palay, supra note 138, at 183. However, by 1989,
not one foreign company had appeared in an economic court. Id. at 188.
241. Id.at 184.
242. John L.W. Garrou, These Courts Aren't Business as Usual; Special
Courts Could Ease Burden on JudicialSystem Due to Complex Litigation, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., May 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Fulton File
(quoting the North Carolina Commission on Business Laws and the Economy's
report discussing the adoption of a specialized business court in North Carolina).

19971

CONTRACT LAW IN THE PRC

529

2. Lack of Published Decisions
A second example of an institutional deficiency in the legal
243
system of the PRC is the shortage of published decisions. 2 4 4
Currently, only the Supreme People's Court publishes cases.
There is debate about whether these cases carry the legal force of
precedent, though a strong argument can be made that they
24 5
A lack of published decisions violates the principle of
do.
normativism required in a legal system operated according to the
Published decisions with precedential value
rule of law. 24 6
provide guidance to individuals about the nature of the law and
how to modify their behavior accordingly, thus improving the
ability of individuals to order their economic affairs efficiently.
To provide guidance and comfort to foreign enterprises in the
PRC, in conjunction with establishing foreign economic courts, a

procedure should be established whereby those courts publish
247

their decisions that will be accorded precedential value.

Creating a separate court that publishes decisions of precedential
value would dramatically increase the comfort level of foreign

enterprises operating in the PRC.

Furthermore, this would be

consistent with the FECL's underlying policy of adopting a

243. The power to both enact and interpret statutes is reserved to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress under Article 67 of the
Constitution of the PRC. 1 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA § 821204 (Univ. of East Asia Press & Inst. of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd.
1987) [hereinafter PRC CONSTITUTION].
244. The Standing Committee delegated some of its interpretive powers to
the Supreme People's Court. Nanping Liu. "Legal Precedents" with Chinese
Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court, 5 J.
CHINESE L. 107, 120 (1991). In 1985, the PRC first began reporting cases in the
Gazette of the Supreme People's Court. The Constitution grants the Supreme
People's Court the authority to "supervise the administration of justice by the local
people's courts at different levels and by the special people's courts." PRC
CONSTITUTION, supranote 243.
245. Scholars who contend that the published cases do not carry the force
of precedent point out that the cases are never cited in lower courts as the
authority for a particular holding. Liu, supra note 224, at 117. However, Nanping
Liu makes a powerful argument that the Supreme People's Court intends cases
published in the Gazette to be binding precedent. Id. at 118-22. "As a practical
matter, the Supreme Court understands, as do the lower courts, that the Gazette
constitutes a legal source with binding force within the judiciary, despite the fact
that the Court specifically forbids the lower courts to cite the reported decisions in
thelrjudgments." Id. at 121.
See discussion supraPart V.B.2.
246.
247. This same suggestion was made in the context of establishing business
courts in the United States. Garrou, supra note 242.
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contract law which mirrors traditional Western contract law for
the purpose of attracting Western capital and technology. 2 4 8
B. Analyzing the SociopoliticalObstacles
Of greater concern to scholars than the institutional
deficiencies in the PRC are the sociopolitical obstacles to the rule
of law. More specifically, some scholars perceive that there is a
lack of "an attitude of legality" among the populace and the
government of the PRC. 2 4 9 Despite the PRC's legal reforms,
"corruption and disregard for the rule of law remain a primary
concern."2 50 However, this obstacle may be overcome by the
influence of economic development and the power of market
forces.
1. The Lack of an Attitude of Legality
The populace's lack of "an attitude of legality" is rooted in the
influence of Confucian philosophy and a general distrust and
dislike of the law. 251 A traditional strand of Confucian thought
holds that people fulfill their highest potential when they live in

harmony with the moral order of the universe. 252 The law is
more than a set of commands and prohibitions, it is a set of
relationships

and

interactions

that

produce

order

and

harmony. 25 3 Resorting to the law to resolve a dispute when the

law is only a set of commands and prohibitions "kills [the] spirit

248. A well developed body of case law can be a magnet for business. For
example, the number of corporations that incorporate in Delaware far exceed the
number incorporated in any other state.
The value of a Delaware domicile to firms is more than an up-to-date code;
Delaware also offers a comprehensive body of case law, which is not easily
replicated by another state, and a handful of experienced judges. These
factors afford firms greater predictability of the legal outcomes of their
decisions, facilitating planning and reducing the costs of doing business.
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle. 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985).
249.
Feinerman, supranote 37, at 67.
250.
Id.
251.
In the Confucian conception, the law is not applied through the formal
interpretation and universal application, of statutes and codes. Perry Keller,
Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 714-715 (1994). Rather,
it is applied in a broader philosophical and moral context. Id. "Chinese society
has n many respects held to this contextuallst approach to law. There continues
to be a widely held belief that the application of positive law should be subject to
extra legal considerations, such as the relationship and circumstances of the
parties and the demands of commonly held standards of justice." Id. at 115.
252.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 157.
253.
Id. at 158-59.

19971

CONTRACT LAW IN THE PRC

[of moral harmony] and destroys the possibility of a truly virtuous

human life."2 5 4 Rather, business people in the PRC have relied
on a network of personal relationships to provide social sanctions
for the breach of agreements. 2 5 5 The populace's lack of an
attitude of legality is a huge obstacle to achieving the rule of law
and, because of its deep roots in Chinese culture, not one that
can be easily overcome. "ITihe health and strength of the rule of
law does not ultimately depend on the efforts
of lawyers, judges
256
or police, but on the attitudes of the people."
Some scholars, however, assert that the application of the
other ingredients to the economic development of the PRC could
encourage and nurture an attitude of legality.2 57 The context of
international business makes the traditional Chinese reliance
upon a network of relationships to enforce agreements less
effective. In this context, where the parties to a contract are often
"strangers," the connections and relationships are not present to
provide a social sanction for breach of an agreement. A legal
system of contractual enforcement is required to provide the
security necessary to promote commercial transactions among
strangers. 2 58 The hope is that exposure to the advantages of a
legal system of contractual enforcement will help to promote an

254.

As Cheng & Rosett describe:

The rules are stultifying, lead away from moral sensitivity, and cause
people to focus on how they can get away with as little commitment to the

spirit behind the law as possible. Following closely in the wake of the
formal law, one always finds people chiseling around the edges. looking for
loopholes, and hypocrites, who are out of touch with the moral spirit of
their behavior. Not far away are sure to dwell large bands of pettifogging
lawyers giving tax advice, teaching people how to make black seem white,
and generally justifying the failure to honor obvious obligations.
Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).
255. 1& at 160-61.
256. WALKER, supranote 166, at 41.
257. "A vibrant, growing economy guided by law could enhance the 'rule of
law' consciousness of the Chinese people, as benefits of legal guidance (instead of
administrative fiat) lead to economic development unachievable in socialist
command economies." Feinerman, supra note 37. at 75.
258. Contract law provides additional sanctions for performance and
compliance through legal enforcement that offers strangers greater hope of
being able to enforce obligations. To the extent that contract law can
deliver on this hope, it supports transactions between strangers and thus
encourages the expansion of markets. There will always be advantages to
playing on one's home turf, just as there will be costs associated with
straying far from home. Nonetheless, the potential of legal enforcement,
designed to provide compensation for disappointed expectations through
institutions that can put money for damages in the injured party's pocket,
can reduce the 'home court advantage.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 187.
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attitude of legality among those involved in transactions with
2 59
foreign enterprises.
2. Government Above the Law
Some scholars assert that the government as well as the
populace lacks an attitude of legality. These scholars insist that
the PRC's government is not "under the law," but is still using it
to promote the state's plan.26 0 As a result, the principles of legal
organization necessary in a society governed by the rule of law
are constantly being violated. For example. the Constitution has
been changed several times, implicating the principle of
certainty. 2 6 1 Several instances of arbitrary enforcement have
been reported. 2 6 2 In short, these scholars assert that the
principle of government under law, the purpose of which is to
protect the individual from the sovereign-one of the major goals
of the rule of law-is not observed in the PRC.
In contrast, other scholars argue that recent political reforms
indicate that the PRC still has a chance of realizing the rule of
law. First, the PRC's struggle to achieve the rule of law was
263
motivated largely by the excesses of the cultural revolution.

Because the government initiated the reforms, the government is
more likely to see them through. 2 64 Second, the PRC has
formally endorsed the rule of law. 26 5 Since 1978, Deng proposed,

259.

"As people achieve higher living standards and accumulate more

wealth, they want a greater say in running their own lives, they want a rule of law.
and a system of government which is seen to be fair and equitable." U.K.'s
Thatcher/China-2: Acknowledged Some Improvement, Dow JONES ASIAN EQUITES
REP., Nov. 14, 1996, at 13:35:00. available in WESTLAW, DJAER Database (quoting
Margaret Thatcher's remarks at an international conference).
has
remained
primarily
Chinese
thinking
about
law
260.
instrumentalist, that is. the recent importance that has been attached to
law and legality . . . has not led to an enhanced respect for law as a
desirable end in itself. Rather, Chinese leaders concluded that law is an
indispensable tool for achieving economic modernization but believe law to
be useful and necessary only inasmuch as it promotes that goal.
Feinerman, supranote 37, at 71.
261.
Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 196-97.
262.
Professor Keith describes an incident in which Deng's Mercedes-Benz
failed to yield to an ambulance, causing an accident for which Deng was not
punished. KErin, supranote 24, at 220.
263.
Id. at 67-68.
264.
See id. at 12.
265.
Peng Zhen. author of the PRC's new legal system, stated:
In my view, the party guides the people in formulating the national
Constitution and the law, it leads the people in observing and enforcing
them, and it must act within the framework of the national Constitution
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"To ensure people's democracy, we must strengthen our legal
system. Democracy has to be institutionalized and written into
law, to make sure that institutions and laws do not change
whenever the leadership changes, or whenever leaders change
their views or shift the focus of their attention."2 66 As a result,
some scholars believe that the PRC has made "substantive

progress" towards achieving the rule of law. 267 While recognizing

that political arbitrariness still exists.2 68 these scholars argue
that "China
has entered an age characterized by the rule of
269
law."
3. The Impact of Market Forces
In discussing whether the PRC's government is under or over
the law in the context of administering Sino-foreign economic
transactions, there is one additional factor that must be
addressed: the power of market forces. Under Professor Walker's
paradigm, a society need not be organized according to liberal
democratic principles to adhere to the rule of law. 2 7 0 For
example, Islamic law achieved one of the major goals of the rule
of law-protecting society from the state-by dividing the social
world into two halves.
One half was governed by the
bureaucratic law of the state. 2 7 1 The other half was governed by

and the law. Otherwise, there will be no socialist democracy or law to
speak of in China.
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
266. DENG. supra note 57, at 157-58.
267. "The rule of law has yet to be established in China ... [but) for more
than a decade China has become deeply involved in a qualitative process of legal
change rooted in the domestic necessities of the changing society and politics."
Id. at 5.
268. "Despite the events of 1989 and the fact that the current system is still
plagued by political arbitrariness, there will be no return to the Maoist style of
lawlessness."
CARLOS WING-HUNG Lo, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING 323 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
269. Id
270. See discussion supraPart V.
271. The state creates bureaucratic lav through the specific rules it
establishes and enforces. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOcIETY 50 (1976).
Bureaucratic law does not implicate the rule of law because it does not embrace
the aims of generality and uniformity in adjudication. Id. at 53. Under a system
governed by bureaucratic law, the functions of legislation, administration, and
adjudication are all in the hands of the bureaucracy. Id. at 53-54. In legal
systems characterized by the rule of law, "[a]dministration [is] separated from
legislation to ensure generality, adjudication [is] distinguished from
administration to safeguard uniformity." Id. at 54.
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customary standards 2 72 and by a body of sacred law. 27 3

The

latter half was, for the most part, beyond the state's control. 2 7 4
In contrast, scholars argue that there is no similar check on
the state's power in the PRC and that the state is above the
law. 2 7 5 Consequently, the rule of law can never be achieved
under the current system of government. In strictly domestic
matters, that assertion appears valid. 2 76 However. in the context

of Sino-foreign economic transactions, there Is an additional
check on the government's power: market forces.
The
government perceives foreign capital, technology, and trade as
crucial elements in achieving the PRC's long-range economic
goals. 2 7 7
Arbitrary enforcement of foreign economic contracts
increases the risk of doing business with and in the PRC. 27 8

If

the PRC acts too arbitrarily, the international business
community will respond to the increased risk by reducing its
interaction with China, reducing the PRC's access to foreign
capital, technology, and trade.
Consequently, the PRC's
government has an incentive to act according to the rule of
law. 2 7 9 If that incentive is great enough to cause the PRC's
government to adhere to Professor Walker's principles of legal
organization in letter and spirit, then who is to say that foreign
economic contracts are not govemed by the rule of law?

272. Customary law is the "recurring mode of interaction among individuals
and groups, together with the more or less explicit acknowledgment by these
groups and individuals that such patterns of interaction produce reciprocal
expectations of conduct that ought to be satisfied." Id. at 49. Customary law,
though influenced by the state, retains its own identity and inertia. Id.
273. The sacred law was governed by theological precepts and could not be
influenced by the state. Id. at 51.
274.
Id. at 52.
Unger argues that ancient Islamic law was not
representative of the rule of law because the functions of legislation,
administration, and adjudication were not sufficiently separated. Id. at 119.
Rather the state and the religious elite performed these functions simultaneously
within their own spheres. I&
275.
In China, unlike other societies, "no important body of sacred precepts
[has] ever eluded governmental control." Id. at 52.
276. This present impotence of the rule in domestic affairs is evidenced by

allegations of human rights abuses and the ease with which contracts can be
avoided under the ECL compared to the FECL. See discussion supraPart III.B,
277.
278.

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
The rule of law enables individuals to efficiently order their affairs by

transferring risk to the party that Is better able to bear It. See discussion supra
Part II.
279. While market forces may give the PRC's government an incentive to act
according to the rule of law, these forces do not instill an attitude of legality within
the Chinese people. However, Professor Feinerman has suggested that a "vibrant,
growing economy guided by law could enhance the 'rule of law' consciousness of
the Chinese people as benefits of legal guidance (instead of administrative flat)
lead to economic development unachievable in socialist command economies."
Feinerman supranote 37, at 75.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
To attract foreign investment, the PRC bifurcated its contract
law. It created the FECL to resolve Sino-foreign disputes and
modeled it after Western contract law, while leaving the contract
law that was used to resolve domestic disputes subject to a more
instrumentalist view of the role of law. However, providing a code
based on the rule of law is insufficient for the implementation of
the rule of law. The rule of law requires legal institutions to
support it. By creating separate foreign economic courts, the
PRC could extend the concept of bifurcation to the institutions
that support the rule of law. In the process, the PRC could
strengthen the ability of these institutions to enforce the rule of
law without dramatically altering the rest of the legal system or
the system of governance.
By making structural changes, the PRC's government could
finish the job of isolating the governance of Sino-foreign contracts
from the rest of the legal system. This isolation, plus the check
provided by market forces against arbitrary action by the PRC's
government, could lay the foundation for the operation of the rule
of law in contractual relationships between Chinese and foreign
enterprises without changing the PRC's system of governance.
The question remains:
is the PRC motivated to make these
changes?
Key to the PRC's motivation to act according to the rule of
law is its economic plan calling for foreign investment. First, the
PRC has to believe that changes are necessary to support the
economic plan. That is, that changes are necessary to continue
or increase foreign economic interaction. However, as previously
discussed, the PRC's economy is booming. Given its current
economic successes, the PRC has little incentive to make any
additional changes either because the rule of law is not as
important to the international business community as the
headlines would lead us to believe or because arbitrary
contractual enforcement is not as widespread as these same
headlines suggest. On the other hand, the enforcement of Sinoforeign contracts according to the rule of law could lead to even
more foreign investment and even greater prosperity for the
PRC. 2 80 Further, the PRC is still not a member of the World
Trade Organization. Hence, there is some incentive for the PRC
to improve its method of enforcing Sino-foreign contracts to
support its economic plan.
Second, the PRC's government has to be willing to adhere to
the plan. Certainly, because of the success of economic reforms,

280.

Cheng & Rosett, supranote 49, at 190.

536

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVol 30:495

the government has an incentive to adhere to continue economic
reform. However, it is speculated that economic development will
lead the people to demand the extension of the rule of law
throughout the legal system.
One Chinese scholar notes,
"[R]eformers in communist systems generally find It 'much easier
281
to part with economic Stalinism than with political Leninism.'"
Domestic political unrest caused by contact with the West could
cause the PRC's government to slow the pace of economic reform
despite its successes and thus reduce the incentive to make
changes in the legal system.
A clue as to the PRC's ability to isolate foreign economic
contracts from the rest of its legal system and its motivation to do
so may be found in the PRC's treatment of Hong Kong after
reversion. In Hong Kong, the PRC has been presented with a
perfect laboratory to test its economic reforms. It is already
isolated from mainland China.
It has a successful, welldeveloped economic system and a Western-friendly legal system
for resolving contractual disputes. The extent to which the PRC
is able and willing to leave that legal system intact may be the
extent to which the PRC's government will be willing to adhere to
its economic plan and thus promote the rule of law.
Even if the PRC's government is committed to resolving Sinoforeign disputes according to the rule of law, it is no guarantee
that the rule of law can be implemented in the PRC. even in the
limited context of the FECL. As Professor Walker noted, the rule
of law requires that the populace have the attitude of legality and
that the law converge with social values because the institutions
that implement the rule of law can be no more effective than the
individuals that comprise them. The instrumentalist conception
of the role of law in the PRC is deeply rooted in cultural
traditions. While market forces may provide individuals with a
strong incentive to adopt the rule of law, these forces will not
overcome centuries of Chinese legal thought overnight.
Further, applying the rule of law only in the context of the
FECL requires not only that the contract law and the institutions
that administer it be bifurcated, but that the populace bifurcate
its view about the role of law as well. To develop an attitude of
legality, the law must converge with social values. To develop an
attitude of legality in the context of the FECL, the populace must
accept the rule of law as the appropriate role for law in that
context. For the populace to accept the rule of law, market forces

281.
Richard Baum, Modemzation and Legal Reform in Post-Mau China: The
Rebirth of SocialistLegality, 19 STUD. IN COMP. COMMUNISM, 69, 103 (1986) (quoting
Stuart R. Schram, "Economics in Command?" Ideology and Policy Since the Third
Plenum. 1978-84, CHINA Q. 461 (Sept. 1984)).
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would have to overcome centuries of Chinese legal thought. It
seems unrealistic to suggest that, if the populace identifies the
rule of law as the appropriate role of law in one arena, it would
not be identified as appropriate in other arenas as well. Once
identified as the appropriate role of law in other arenas, it seems
likely that there would be a popular movement toward the rule of
law in those arenas. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the
bifurcation of the PRC's contract law will allow the PRC to truly
implement the rule of law with respect to the FECL and still
maintain the current system of government. Even if the PRC is
able to effectively implement the rule of law in the context of the
FECL prior to any political change, it seems that political change
must surely follow.
Mark C. Lewis
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